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Social  applications  on  mobile  platform typically  use  a  central  server.  Use  of  social 
applications usually involves private information such as user profiles, that users wish 
to share securely and in a controlled manner. The central server can function as a trusted 
central authority that provides the necessary security mechanisms for maintaining the 
privacy of the users. An alternative for central servers is to use ad hoc networks where 
there is no central server, but all the communication is done strictly on a peer-to-peer 
basis. This poses certain challenges in regards to user privacy. The lack of a central 
server means that the necessary security mechanisms must be in place on each singular 
device.
This  thesis  analyzes  how  the  privacy  of  a  user  can  be  maintained  in  social 
applications in the context of ad hoc networks. An example social application, Social 
Index Engine (SoInx), that was designed to run on ad hoc networks is introduced. A 
significant component of the application was sharing profiles between users via interest 
matching.
This thesis presents the security mechanisms of SoInx in detail and their efficacy is 
evaluated using a hostile client that attemps to breach the privacy of the users running 
the SoInx application. The hostile client was run in a simulated environment, where the 
simulator  models  movement patterns  of  large populations  in  an urban area,  thereby 
allowing natural encounters between SoInx users and the hostile client to occur.
The hostile client attempted to find out whether an encountered user has been seen 
before. The results demonstrated that the information SoInx interest matching protocol 
reveals is sufficient to break the privacy property unlinkability, making it feasible to 
track people's movements around the city.
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Sosiaaliset sovellukset mobiiliympäristössä hyödyntävät tyypillisesti keskuspalvelinta. 
Sosiaalisten  sovellusten  käyttö  sisältää  yleensä  yksityistä  informaatiota,  kuten 
käyttäjäprofiileja,  joiden  sisältöä  käyttäjät  haluavat  jakaa  turvallisesti  ja  hallitusti. 
Keskuspalvelin  voi  toimia  luotettuna  keskusauktoriteettina,  joka  tarjoaa  tarvittavat 
tietoturvamekanismit  käyttäjien  yksityisyyden  ylläpitämiseksi.  Vaihtoehtona 
keskuspalvelimille  on käyttää  ad  hoc -verkkoja,  joissa ei  ole  keskuspalvelinta,  vaan 
kaikki tiedonvälitys tapahtuu vertaisverkossa suoraan käyttäjien kesken. Tämä aiheuttaa 
haasteita  käyttäjien yksityisyyden suhteen.  Keskuspalvelimen puuttuminen tarkoittaa, 
että tarvittavat tietoturvamekanismit täytyy sisällyttää jokaiseen yksittäiseen laitteeseen.
Tässä  diplomityössä  analysoidaan,  miten  käyttäjän  yksityisyyttä  voidaan  ylläpitää 
sosiaalisissa  sovelluksissa  ad  hoc  -verkoissa.  Työssä  esitellään  sosiaalinen 
esimerkkisovellus,  Social  Index  Engine  (SoInx),  joka  toimii  ad  hoc  -verkoissa. 
Merkittävä  osa  sovellusta  oli  käyttäjien  profiilien  jakaminen  vertailemalla  yhteisiä 
mielenkiinnon kohteita.
Tässä  diplomityössä  kuvaillaan  SoInx-sovelluksen  tietoturvamekanismit 
yksityiskohtaisesti,  ja  niiden tehokkuutta  arvioidaan vihamielisen sovelluksen avulla, 
joka pyrkii murtamaan samassa ympäristössä ajettavien SoInx-käyttäjien yksityisyyttä. 
Vihamielistä  sovellusta  ajettiin  SoInx-sovellusten  kanssa  simuloidussa  ympäristössä, 
jossa  simulaattori  mallintaa  suurten  ihmismäärien  liikkeitä  kaupunkialueella.  Tämä 
simuloi luonnollisia kohtaamisia SoInx-käyttäjien ja vihamielisen sovelluksen kanssa.
Vihamielinen  sovellus  pyrki  selvittämään,  onko kohdattu  käyttäjä  nähty  aiemmin. 
Tulokset osoittivat, että SoInxin yhteisiä mielenkiinnon kohteita selvittävä protokolla 
jakaa  riittävästi  informaatiota  rikkomaan  yksityisyyttä,  mahdollistaen  ihmisten 
liikkeiden seuraamista kaupunkialueella.
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TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Ad hoc In this context a technology that enables peer-to-peer 
communication without infrastructure such as access 
points or routers
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
C++ A programming language
Computationally difficult Impossible for modern supercomputers to do in a 
reasonable amount of time. A term commonly used in 
cryptography to describe infeasibility of breaking an 
encryption.
DTN Delay-tolerant networking
MAC address Media access control address; physical address; a 
unique identifier for a network interfaces for physical 
layer
PCSI Private cardinality of set-intersection
POI Point of interest
PSI Private set-intersection
Python A programming language
Qt A cross-platform application framework
SMC Secure multi-party computation
SoInx Social Index Engine, an example social application 
designed for ad hoc networks. Also the name of the 
project.
WLAN Wireless local area network
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1 INTRODUCTION
Wireless connections between mobile devices  are  usually  implemented via  a central 
server and a wireless Internet connection. A less widespread way to connect between 
devices is using technologies that communicate in a peer-to-peer manner, where devices 
in close enough proximity form an ad hoc network. Examples for technologies enabling 
this type of communication are the ad hoc mode of Wireless LAN and Bluetooth. This 
peer-to-peer manner of communication has some advantages, namely it does not require 
any pre-existing infrastructure such as WLAN access points or mobile base stations. 
However, it requires physical proximity between the communicating devices.
Ad  hoc  connection  extends  communication  capabilities  of  mobile  devices  by 
increasing  their  awareness  of  their  surroundings.  This  opportunistic  access  allows 
different kinds of social applications to emerge, namely proximity based services and 
interactions between users.
The devices can form and maintain the network even while individual devices appear 
or disappear from the communication range of other devices. It is not necessary for 
every device in an ad hoc network to be within the range of every other device; one 
device  (or  possibly  several  devices)  can  act  as  an intermediary  and relay  messages 
between two devices that otherwise would not be able to communicate with one another. 
This means that ad hoc networks are self-organizing and adaptive [1]. This is illustrated 
in Figure 1.1. A solid arrow represents a direct connection between devices, i.e. they are 
in  the  communication range.  A dotted arrow represents  a  connection that  has  to  be 
routed through one or several intermediary devices.
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Social applications on mobile devices are nowadays commonplace, but most of them 
are  implemented  to  utilize  a  central  server  [2].  Since  users  of  social  applications 
typically  supply  and  share  private  information  such  as  user  profiles,  security 
mechanisms are needed to do this privately. The availability of a central server permits 
the use of the server as a trusted central authority that manages most of the security 
mechanisms.
When the social application runs on ad hoc networks, the peer-to-peer manner of 
connectivity requires a different approach for security and privacy issues. The lack of a 
central server means that each device must have all the privacy and security solutions 
implemented in its hardware and software. However, this means that no third party has 
to be trusted to keep the users' data and communications safe. The privacy requirements 
must  also  be  balanced  with  other  requirements  of  mobile  applications  such  as 
minimizing energy consumption and data throughput.
Figure 1.1: An example ad hoc network. The connections from devices A and B with 
device D are routed via device C.
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To research social applications in the ad hoc environment, a prototype application 
called  Social  Index Engine,  SoInx,  was  developed by a  research  group at  Tampere 
University of Technology, which the author of this thesis was a part of. SoInx tries to 
find new interesting people and content in proximity, based on shared interests between 
users. SoInx uses several sources (inputs) of interests, and tries to match them between 
people in close enough proximity.
A simulator  was  used  for  testing  proximity  based  applications.  The  simulator 
includes a mobility model that models movement patterns of large populations in an 
urban area. The simulator allows large scale testing of social applications reliant on ad 
hoc networking between proximate devices.
In this thesis the privacy of SoInx is analyzed against known privacy threats and 
evaluated with a help of a hostile client that attempts breach the privacy of SoInx users. 
The security mechanisms of SoInx for maintaining privacy are described in detail, and 
possible  attacks  against  these security  mechanisms are  discussed.  The hostile  client 
implements an attack where it attempts to recognize whether an encountered user has 
been seen before. This is done by utilizing a large interest database. The hostile client 
was tested in a simulated environment with SoInx clients. The results of the hostile 
client execution showed that the attack was a feasible way to track the movements of 
singular users and masses of users alike.
1.1 Background
This thesis introduces the SoInx application, and privacy and security matters related to 
it.  The  SoInx  research  project  was  a  co-operative  project  between  Nokia  Research 
Center  and  Department  of  Computer  Systems  (later  Department  of  Pervasive 
Computing)  at  Tampere  University  of  Technology.  The  SoInx  application  was 
developed as a prototype social application for Nokia Instant Community platform.
The  SoInx  project  is  a  continuation  of  a  research  project  called  TWIN,  which 
produced a social mobile application that allows people to chat, send files, and form 
communities in the context of local wireless ad hoc networking.
The author of this thesis joined the SoInx research team after the initial version of the 
SoInx application was developed. The work of the author included further development 
to the SoInx application and the SoInx simulator with the research team, and also more 
comprehensive  privacy  analysis  of  the  SoInx  application  and  its  environment.  The 
SoInx simulator was developed earlier during the TWIN project [3]. The hostile client 
was also the responsibility of the author.
In september 2013, an article about SoInx application and its user tests was published 
and presented at a workshop on Mobile Cloud and Social Perspective (MoCSoP) [4].
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1.2 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the prototype implementation 
of the example social application SoInx and describes related works on proximity based 
social applications. Chapter 3 presents an introduction to privacy issues and discusses 
how they map to proximity based social applications on ad hoc networks. Chapter 4 
describes SoInx security mechanisms in detail.  Chapter 5 describes possible privacy 
issues and explains how the security elements of SoInx solve those issues. Trade-offs 
between  chosen  and  rejected  security  mechanisms  are  also  discussed.  Chapter  6 
contains an assessment of SoInx privacy using a hostile client that aims to breach user 
privacy. The methods of evaluation and possible types of attacks are discussed. One 
type of attack is described in detail and the implemented hostile client and its results are 
discussed.  Chapter  7  contains  the  evaluation  of  SoInx  application  via  user  testing. 
Possible  improvements  and  further  development  ideas  are  also  discussed.  Finally, 
chapter 8 gives the conclusion of the thesis.
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2 SOINX
This  chapter  introduces  a  social  application  called  Social  Index Engine,  SoInx,  and 
describes the prototype implementation.
SoInx is  a  proximity  based social  application that  runs  on local  ad  hoc network 
environment. This means that it only communicates with other SoInx running devices 
that are in close enough proximity. SoInx uses no external infrastructure such as WLAN 
routers or mobile Internet; all communication between devices is instantiated in a peer-
to-peer manner.
The  main  purpose  of  the  application  is  to  find  new  information  and  interesting 
people.
2.1 SoInx Basics
The main function of SoInx is to discover new interesting people based on common 
interests. Proximity is an important part of the concept; only with SoInx users that are in 
close enough proximity (i.e. in the range of the ad hoc networking technology) any kind 
of interest matching process is started. This means that people with matching interests 
are  already  physically  close  to  one  another,  enabling  people  to  quickly  form 
relationships if they wish.
A single piece of interest can be for example a Facebook like or a LinkedIn contact. 
Based on user interaction SoInx tries to learn which interests and what kind of people 
the user finds most interesting.
2.2 Environment and Constraints
SoInx works in an environment where the devices see only other SoInx running devices 
that are in close enough proximity. The range is technology dependent. One example is 
the ad hoc mode of WLAN which was chosen for the application. Another example is 
Bluetooth [5], where the range is significantly smaller which is not large enough for the 
purposes of this application.
The prototype implementation uses an experimental WLAN mesh communication 
called Nokia Instant Community implemented by Nokia Research Center  [6]. Nokia 
Instant Community adds power saving functionality on top of the WLAN technology.
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All the messages in SoInx are sent in a broadcast manner. Since in ad hoc networks 
everyone close enough can see every message, messages directed to a single person 
should be encrypted so that the outsiders are prevented from viewing the contents of 
such messages. This is achieved using the SoInx encryption protocol that is described in 
more detail in section 4.2.
The ad hoc network may be used by other devices and applications. Other than valid 
SoInx messages are simply ignored. This makes it  unlikely for other applications to 
disturb  communication  between  SoInx  clients,  besides  consuming  communication 
bandwidth.
The users that communicate together do not form any explicit communities. Interests 
are  broadcasted  to  everyone  in  the  range,  and  after  establishing  common  interests 
subsequent messages, although broadcasted, are done in a one-to-one manner.
Due to privacy issues, the network identifier is changed every hour. Whenever a new 
SoInx user appears with a previously unseen network identifier, SoInx does not attempt 
to link it to previous encounters; all the new encounters are assumed to be previously 
unknown from the perspective of the application.
This type of proximity based peer-to-peer communication may prove to be useful 
especially in areas where mobile Internet is inaccessible or unstable, such as developing 
countries.
2.3 Functional Requirements
Background operation. SoInx application was designed to run in the background most 
of the time. It should find interesting people without any user input, and then possibly 
alert the user when an especially interesting person is found.
Tolerant to network changes. The nature of mobile ad hoc networks is that the 
network topology can change at  any moment.  For example any node can appear  or 
disappear at any moment. SoInx application should be able to handle these kinds of 
situations.
Touch based UI. SoInx was designed to run on Nokia N9 mobile phone. This means 
that user interaction is implemented via a touch based user interface with a screen the 
size of 480 x 854 pixels.
Privacy. Main purpose of SoInx is finding new interesting people based on common 
interests. This should be accomplished without revealing too much personal information 
to other users, and making it sufficiently hard for any outside observer to gather such 
information. This is a major perspective this thesis discusses SoInx application.
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2.4 Technical Requirements
Since SoInx application is running on a mobile device that is usually not connected to 
an external power source,  minimizing battery consumption is an important requirement. 
This was taken into account by avoiding algorithms requiring high performance, and by 
minimizing  network  traffic.  Both  the  size  and  the  number  of  messages  sent  were 
reduced.
Most  of  the  time SoInx application  runs  in  the  background.  While  in  this  state, 
broadcasting type messages are sent only periodically. The SoInx messaging scheme is 
discussed more thoroughly in section  4.3. Lower power consumption is also achieved 
using the Nokia Instant Community platform [6].
2.5 Inputs for Interests
Different interest sources – inputs – are used to gather interests that the user may wish 
to share with others. These interests could include music, movies, friends, likes (in the 
context of social networks), or any piece of information that user finds interesting that 
can be used to connect different people.
SoInx application  uses  a  plugin  architecture  for  different  sources  of  inputs;  new 
sources can be added when deemed necessary. The main interest sources implemented 
in the prototype were social networks, and personal user data on the device.
2.5.1 Social Networks
Social network sites are useful sources for pieces of information that the user might be 
interested in. Many social  networking sites have ways for the users to define friend 
relationships between themselves. This works as a SoInx interest, since having common 
friends could be a good indication that people may wish to get to know one another.
Another widespread notion among social networking sites is the concept of a like. 
This concept may have different names in separate social networking sites (such as '+1' 
on Google+, or a thumbs up on Youtube), but they all denote a similar intent: the user 
likes something. This also is a good piece of information to serve as a SoInx interest.
Social networking sites usually allow access to users' likes, friend relationships, and 
other  data  programmatically  using  their  defined  API  (application  programming 
interface). Using this type of API usually requires a user specific secret key, or the user's 
username and password.
Facebook  was  the  first  social  network  input  implemented  for  SoInx.  Facebook's 
popularity  allows  to  collect  a  large  number  of  interests,  both  likes  and  friend 
relationships. Facebook uses OAuth 2.0 for authenticating a user and allowing to extract 
user data via the Facebook API [7].
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Twitter was also implemented as an input. A user's followers, followees (whom the 
user follows), and tweets (Twitter  posts) were used as interests. Twitter  uses OAuth 
1.0A for authentication [8].
Other  social  networking sites  such as  LinkedIn and Google+ were considered as 
inputs, but they were not implemented due to other features being considered as having 
higher  priorities.  Implementing  them would  not  have  brought  significant  advantage, 
considering that interests from Facebook and Twitter were comprehensive enough for 
the prototyping purposes.
SoInx  attempts  periodically  to  redownload  the  interests  from  the  utilized  social 
networks. This allows SoInx to receive more interests as the user gathers more likes and 
friend relationships etc.
2.5.2 Personal Data on the Device
Mobile devices nowadays, i.e. smart phones, contain plenty of personal user data. Some 
of the data the user may wish to share with others. SoInx uses this data found on the  
mobile device as a source of interests.
Typical data that works as SoInx interests would be for example PDF and media files 
found on the device, bookmarks from web browsers, contact information on the address 
book, and installed third party applications on the device.
SoInx can take this type of information and use it as interests.
2.5.3 Other Interest Sources – Plugin System
The number and nature of interest sources are not hard coded in the system. SoInx uses 
a  plugin  system that  allows  adding  new interest  sources  later  on.  This  permits  the 
utilization of future social networks and other upcoming web applications as interest 
sources.
In  addition  to  input  sources,  the  user  can  also  manually  input  things  they  are 
interested  in.  These  interests  take  the  form of  textual  keywords,  such  as  ”hiking”, 
”basketball”, etc.
2.6 User Interface
SoInx prototype application was designed to run on a handheld Nokia N9 phone with a 
touch  screen.  Two basic  requirements  for  the  user  interface  were  ease  of  use,  and 
scalability.
Scalability in this context means that the user interface should be usable regardless of 
how many SoInx users are in proximity; in an environment with lots of users this could 
mean that only the most interesting users are displayed.
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2.6.1 Radar View
Radar view was considered as the main view in the SoInx application. It visualizes other 
SoInx users in proximity. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
The center of the view represents the user holding the device, and icons floating on 
different circle perimeters represent other SoInx users in proximity. The type and color 
of the icon is decided on the common interests and how interesting the other user is 
deemed by the learning algorithms of SoInx. The icon colors vary between green and 
red, where green indicates a less interesting person and red indicates a more interesting 
person. The distance from the center depicts the number of hops a message must pass 
through to reach the user.
2.6.2 Importing Interests
The user can import interests into SoInx from several sources. The user can choose from 
a list of possible sources for importing interests. This is shown in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.1: Radar view
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The user can highlight  a source such as Facebook and tap ”Refresh”.  The user's 
Facebook username and password is asked, after which the user's Facebook likes and 
friend relationships are downloaded and imported as interests. This is one of the few use 
cases when an Internet connection is required while using SoInx.
2.6.3 Contact Information
SoInx  application  allows  the  user  to  fill  a  contact  card  with  the  user's  contact 
information. This information can be sent to other SoInx users that seem interesting. 
This is shown in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.2: User interface for importing 
interests.
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Figure 2.3: User interface for setting up contact 
information.
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2.6.4 Configuring Privacy Settings
Some data interpreted as interests may contain information that the user wishes to keep 
private. Therefore, SoInx application must include a way to indicate which interests are 
fine for others to see, and which interests should be kept hidden.
SoInx solves this by having a simple user interface to configure the privacy settings 
for each source of interests. This is shown in Figure 2.4. The possible privacy values are 
public,  shared  secret,  and  hidden.  Public  means  that  interests  from this  source  are 
broadcasted normally in query messages. Shared secret means that interests from this 
source are never broadcasted, but they are used for matching the same interests when 
seen broadcasted by other users. Querying and matching are explained in more detail in 
Chapter  4. Hidden means that this input source is never taken in consideration in the 
functionality of SoInx application.
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Figure 2.4: User interface for privacy settings.
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2.6.5 User View
After clicking a user icon on the radar view, a user view is opened. This is shown in 
Figure 2.5.
User view informs if the user has common interests with the match. The top interest 
is shown (decided by the learning algorithm). This view allows the user to like or dislike 
the match (the icons ”Like” and ”Not Interesting” respectively). Clicking these are used 
as inputs for the learning algorithm that determines how important certain interests are 
for the user. Tapping ”Later” leaves this view and goes back to the radar view, and ”See 
More” opens up the user interest view that is discussed in section 2.6.6.
Figure 2.5: Main view showing information on 
another user.
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2.6.6 User Interest List
User interest view shows a list of all the common interests the user has with a specified 
match. The list is scrollable, if there are more interests than what fits on the screen.
The user interest  list  is  shown in Figure  2.6. The view also includes a button to 
contact the person. This opens a view described in section 2.6.7.
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2.6.7 Send Contact
Send Contact view allows the user to contact a person he/she deems interesting.
The user has two ways of contacting the person; one is to send a contact card which 
can be filled using the contact information view (section  2.6.3). The other way is to 
establish a chat connection with the person. The actual chatting was not implemented in 
this prototype due to prioritizing reasons, but tapping the chat button was logged and 
used as an input for the learning algorithm.
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2.7 Mobility Generator and Simulator
A simulator was used for testing the SoInx application with a large  number of users to  
get a sense of the communication patterns and functionality when the application is used 
by  a  larger  population.  The  simulator  was  developed  during  the  preceding  TWIN 
research project,  and is  described in more detail  in  Janne Kulmala's  thesis  [3].  The 
simulator was designed to facilitate faster and easier testing of social applications in ad 
hoc networks. This was achieved by modeling movement patterns of a large population 
in an urban area. The model corresponds to the real life movement patterns, since it 
simulates the behavior of people commuting between home, the place of work or study, 
and places of interest.
The  simulator  simulates  daily  movements  of  several  hypothetical  mobile  device 
carrying people. For every simulated person, one client application, which represents 
the ad hoc network using software (in this case the SoInx application), is started. The 
client applications can be run on separate desktop machines or mobile devices.  The 
communication between the core simulator machine and client machines is done via an 
IP network. The system architecture of the simulator is illustrated in Figure 2.8.
While  the  simulator  application  is  running,  it  transmits  messages  between  the 
running clients that are in close enough proximity in the simulated environment. The 
concept  of  time  is  also  provided  to  the  client  applications  by  the  simulator.  The 
simulator  also  includes  a  user  interface  that  visualizes  the  people's  movements  and 
message passing while the simulation runs. This is described more rigorously in section 
2.7.2.
The simulator environment was used to test and evaluate user privacy with a hostile 
client that attempts to breach the privacy of SoInx users.
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2.7.1 Mobility Generator
Mobility Generator is a tool that generates daily schedules for a group of people and 
models their movements around a city or other urban area, to be used in the simulation. 
The area where people's movements are generated, is taken from OpenStreetMap and 
can be any urban region.
Inputs for Mobility Generator are the area map (taken from OpenStreetMap) and 
mobility parameters. The map is analyzed, and movement patterns for simulated people 
are generated. The movements patterns are saved into a file, which in turn is used by the 
core simulator application.  The mobility parameters are adjustable,  and they include 
person specific parameters such as the walking speed, the probability that the simulated 
person uses a car, how many places are visited per day etc. They also include simulation 
specific parameters, such as the time frame of the simulation i.e. how many days are 
simulated, and how many people are simulated.
Mobility Generator includes a user interface for configuring the mobility parameters, 
and for visualizing the map of the urban area where the simulation takes place in. The 
map visualization allows zooming into specific POIs (point of interest) in the urban area 
and viewing their type such as school, restaurant, grocery store, et cetera. The map view 
can  also  be  used  for  finding  problems  such  as  errors  in  the  path  finder.  The  user 
interface of the Mobility Generator is shown in Figure 2.9.
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Mobility information. For each simulated person, mobility information is generated. 
The mobility information of a person consists of a path,  represented in the form of 
time/location pairs. Time refers to a certain point in simulated time and the location 
refers  to  a  2D coordinate  on  the  map.  During  the  simulation  a  simulated  person's 
location and velocity at a certain time can be calculated by linear interpolation between 
two consecutive path points [3].
Daily schedule. For every simulated user a daily schedule is generated for every 
simulated day. A simulated person is assumed to have a home, where every night is 
spent in. The home for each simulated user is chosen randomly from the set of buildings 
without any interest information in the OpenStreetMap data; these are assumed to be 
residential buildings. The probability of choosing a specific building is weighted by the 
building size.
A person  is  also  assumed  to  have  one  important  place  to  visit  every  day.  This 
represents the person's place of work or study. This place is chosen randomly from POIs 
on the map data. The POIs are weighted by their category, for example schools are more 
likely to be chosen.
After spending the day at the place of work or study, the simulated person visits a 
small number of interesting places that represent places of hobbies, grocery store visits 
etc. These places are also chosen randomly, weighted by their category and distance 
from home and the place of work or study.
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A simulated person is assigned randomly to own a car, which determines the velocity 
at  which  the  person  can  move  between  places  of  visit.  The  route  between  visiting 
location is  along the roads (from the OpenStreetMap data),  and is  calculated by A* 
pathfinder algorithm [9], where the cost function is the travel time between two road 
nodes (OpenStreetMap data includes speed limits for road nodes).
Real world applicability  of  the generated mobility information. In  the  TWIN 
project, a user trial with 300 devices was undertaken. The trial showed that the real 
world movement patterns gathered from the user trial corresponded to the generated 
mobility information of this mobility model [3].
2.7.2 Simulator Core
The simulator takes mobility data generated by Mobility Generator. It uses the data to 
simulate people's movements.
The  simulator  is  responsible  for  maintaining  the  state  of  the  simulation,  which 
includes keeping track of the simulated time, the simulated people's locations, and the 
state of the network.  Whenever people are in close enough proximity,  the simulator 
allows them (i.e. their mobile devices) to send messages between one another. Also the 
simulated  network  identifiers  are  changed  periodically,  to  simulate  the  privacy 
enhancing feature of Nokia Instant Community platform.
For each simulated user, a client application is started. The application represents the 
software the simulated people are running on their devices. The simulator provides a 
client API that provides the state of the simulated environment, and enables the client 
applications to communicate with each other via the simulated ad hoc network. The 
client applications use the API also for obtaining the current time and scheduling events 
in the future. This allows the simulation to run on variable speed.
The client API works via UNIX sockets or TCP sockets. This allows for the client  
applications to be run on both the same machine as the simulator is running on, and on 
different machines that communicate via IP network with the simulator machine. In the 
case of same machine, the client applications are run on different processes than the 
core simulator application. This is to achieve better decoupling between the simulator 
and the client applications, and also to prevent accidental sharing of state between the 
client applications and the simulator application.
The  simulator  includes  a  user  interface  to  view  the  state  of  the  simulated 
environment.  This  includes  a  map  view  where  the  simulated  clients  are  shown  as 
colored circles. The area of the circle represents the reach of the ad hoc network of a 
specific device in the simulation. The colors are same for those clients who at a specific 
point of (simulated) time are in close enough proximity to be able to send messages to 
one another, forming an ad hoc network. The user interface of the simulator is shown in 
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Figure 2.10. The figure also includes a single SoInx application running in the simulated 
environment.
The user interface allows to adjust the speed of the simulation, and allows to view 
simulated  user  specific  statistics  in  real  time.  This  includes  statistics  such  as  sent 
messages, encountered users, how many users consitute the current ad hoc network in 
the simulated location, et cetera.
After  the  simulation  run  is  complete,  the  simulator  generates  a  report.  This  is 
discussed more in section 2.9.1.
2.7.3 Network Model
The  simulated  network  in  the  simulation  estimates  a  radio  channel  and  a  network 
protocol to achieve statistically similar behavior of a real world ad hoc network. It is 
modeled after an ad hoc network that implements multi-hop features and power saving 
features. The communication in the network also has a possibility of signal degradation 
in the form of packet loss, the likelihood of which increases as the distance between the 
devices grows.
Figure 2.10: Simulation run with a SoInx client on the foreground (bottom right). On 
the left some statistics specific to a simulated user are shown, and in the middle is the 
map view.
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Multi-hop. Multi-hop in an ad hoc network refers to the feature that singular devices 
will forward traffic by re-transmitting packets that they receive. This makes it possible 
for two devices to communicate even when out of each other's radio range.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Packet loss. The network model also implements the possiblity of packet loss. This 
is because a radio channel has reliability issues caused by background noise, other radio 
transmissions in proximity, and signal decay over distance. The packet loss probability 
uses  a  linear  model,  where  the  probability  of  packet  loss  increases  as  the  distance 
between the communicating devices grows, and transmission is not possible when the 
distance is more than the radio range.
Power saving. To prolong battery life the devices are asleep much of the time, and 
they  wake  up  only  periodically  to  send  and  receive  traffic.  Devices  that  wish  to 
communicate between one another has to be awake at the same time. This is achieved 
by periodically staying awake a longer time, to synchronize the wake up periods of the 
devices.
Communication zones. Communication zone refers to a set of devices following the 
same power saving cycle. The zones are supposed to be as large as possible, so that the 
maximum number of devices are able to communicate between one another. When a 
device  notices  that  it  is  in  the  range  of  several  communication  zones  that  are  on 
different power saving cycles, the device synchronizes with the communication zone 
that is the largest (i.e. it consists of the largest number of devices). This feature causes a 
domino effect of all the devices migrating to the same communications zone, sometimes 
one by one after a delay of several power saving cycles.
The network model is described more rigorously in the thesis of Janne Kulmala [3].
2.8 Constraints of the Simulator Environment 
The  computer  running  the  simulator  places  some  constraints  on  the  scope  and  the 
number of tested client applications. The client applications can be run on the same 
computer,  or  on  different  machines  while  communicating  with  the  simulator  via 
network. When run on the same machine, RAM and CPU limits the memory footprint, 
performance, and the number of client applications. When run on different machines, 
the network bandwidth places limits on the number and size of the messages the client 
applications are sending.
SoInx applications  had several  optimizations  to  reduce  the  amount  of  RAM and 
processing power required. The user interface was made optional; it was started only for 
those  simulated  clients  where  user  interaction  was  required.  Also  the  number  of 
messages  sent  between  simulated  clients  was  aggressively  reduced  whenever  their 
communication was deemed uninteresting. An example situation was user testing; only 
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the  messages  relating  to  the  person  doing  the  user  testing  were  interesting.  Other 
messages between simulated clients who were not in proximity of the tested user were 
just ignored in the context of the user test. Henceforth, those messages were not even 
sent to reduce CPU load and messaging bandwidth.
Most of our simulations (including the user tests)  were done with 900 simulated 
users in the area of Tampere. The simulated SoInx clients were run on the same desktop 
machine as the simulator application. The simulator was able to run 5 days of simulated 
time in less than one hour of CPU time.
2.9 Simulation Run Statistics
During the simulation run, statistics are gathered for each simulated user. Several types 
of  data  are  gathered:  Sent  packets,  Received  packets,  Events,  Appearances  and 
Disappearances.
This data is used to generate reports after the simulation run.
2.9.1 Reports
Total amounts of gathered data for each person are shown in the main report view. The 
report is shown in Figure 2.11.
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Also a more detailed report is generated for each simulated person; the report shows 
the number of sent messages etc. during a certain time frame. This helps to see at which 
times the communication between the SoInx users is most active. A single user report 
view is shown in Figure 2.12.
Figure 2.11: Report generated by the simulator
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2.10 Related Works
Related works consist of applications and research related to mobile social networking. 
Some use ad hoc networking, others are server based. The social networking aspect is 
described, and the way the application takes privacy into account, is discussed.
2.10.1 Highlight
Highlight is a social networking application for iOS and Android [10]. The application 
is similar to SoInx in that it shows nearby people who have common interests with you. 
Instead  of  using  ad  hoc  networking,  Highlight  is  server  based;  the  user  position  is 
periodically sent to a central server, and the server uses this position data to notify users 
when there are  friends  or  interesting users  nearby.  This  also means that  the ad hoc 
networking related privacy risks are avoided.
Highlight has attracted some criticism for disclosing private information to strangers 
[11].  Since  SoInx application  uses  similar  sources  for  interests  (Facebook likes  and 
friend relationships), it is likely that if published, it would receive similar criticism.
Figure 2.12: Report generated for a single user
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2.10.2 E-SmallTalker
E-SmallTalker  is  a  distributed  mobile  system  for  social  networking  in  physical 
proximity  [12].  It  aims  to  initiate  meaningful  small  talk  between  two  strangers  by 
discovering shared interests, and suggesting them for topics of conversation.
E-SmallTalker uses Bluetooth Service Discovery Protocol as the ad hoc networking 
technology.  Interest  matching  is  achieved  using  a  low  bandwidth  query  methods 
utilizing  Bloom filters  [13].  Bloom filters  use one-way hashing to  encode interests, 
which  makes  it  difficult  to  derive  the  original  set  of  interests,  therefore  protecting 
privacy of the users. However, E-SmallTalker is vulnerable to a dictionary attack [14].
2.10.3 Serendipity
Serendipity  is  a  match  making  software  that  calculates  similarity  scores  between 
encountered  users'  profiles,  and notifies  the  user  when the  score  is  above a  certain 
threshold.  Serendipity  uses  a  combined  ad  hoc  networking  and  server  based 
implementation; Bluetooth discovery protocol is used to discover nearby users, and the 
user profiles and the match making are implemented on a central  server.  The users' 
profiles are associated with their Bluetooth identifiers [15].
Serendipity  takes  user  privacy  into  account  by  revealing  information  on  the 
encountered user  only when the  similarity  score is  high enough.  Only  the common 
interests are revealed, in addition to optional user specified contact information. Since 
Serendipity requires for Bluetooth to be on, it exposes the user to the privacy threat of  
linkability (section 3.2.1), allowing someone to track people's movements based on the 
Bluetooth identifier.
2.10.4 FindU
FindU allows the user to find the user with the profile that is the most similar to his/hers 
from the  group of  users  in  proximity.  The  existence  of  a  trusted  third  party  is  not 
assumed.
FindU  uses  two  privacy  levels;  higher  privacy  level  leverages  PCSI  (private 
cardinality of set-intersection) and the lower one leverages PSI (private set-intersection) 
protocols. The efficiency of these protocols is improved by using SMC (secure multi-
party computation) and polynomial secret sharing, and several key enhancements [14].
FindU is  more secure and privacy preserving than SoInx,  but  its  functionality  is 
slightly  different;  e.g.  FindU  assumes  established  secure  communication  channels 
between each pair of users in proximity. SoInx use cases using FindU protocols would 
require a lot more computation and message passing than using SoInx protocols.
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3 PRIVACY
This work focuses on privacy issues. Hence a more general introduction to privacy is 
beneficial for understanding the general framework related to privacy issues.
Privacy properties and threats are introduced, and the properties are discussed in the 
context  of  SoInx.  The  privacy  considerations  in  ad  hoc  networking  context  are 
discussed. The security mechanisms of SoInx for maintaining security and privacy are 
introduced in Chapter 4.
3.1 Terminology
Privacy issues have some established terminology [16]. Terms are used in later sections 
describing security mechanisms of SoInx.
Here some common privacy related terms are explained:
Action. Something a user or the client application does in the context of the privacy 
environment in examination. This can be for example sending a message.
Actor, also used: subject. Typically a user in the context of the privacy environment 
in examination. For example a sender of a message.
Actee, also used:  object. A target of an action that an actor does. For example the 
recipient of a message sent by an actor.
IOI, Item of Interest.  Item of interest  is  a piece of information that some actor 
might be interested in. Examples: an action, a message, a location of a user, a user's 
identity.
Hostile client, Also used: attacker, adversary client.
A hostile client is an actor in the environment that intends to breach the security or 
privacy of the user or users. An example hostile client that aims to resolve whether an 
encountered user has been seen before or not was developed. This is discussed more in 
Chapter 6.
3.2 Privacy Properties and Threats
Privacy properties are usually divided into hard privacy and soft privacy [16]. Privacy 
can also be examined via privacy threats; each privacy property has a corresponding 
privacy threat.
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The concept of privacy can also be divided into server level privacy and network 
level  privacy.  Since  SoInx assumes  the  nonexistence  of  a  trusted  third  party  (i.e.  a 
server), this work focuses solely on the network level privacy.
Hard privacy properties and their explanations and the corresponding privacy threats 
are listed in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Hard privacy properties and threats
Privacy property Explanation
Unlinkability Corresponding privacy threat: Linkability.
Unlinkability from an attacker's point of view 
means  that  it  is  not  possible  to  sufficiently 
distinguish  whether  two  IOIs  such  as  subjects, 
messages, or actions are related or not. Linkability 
is the negation of unlinkability i.e. the attacker can 
sufficiently  distinguish  whether  two  IOIs  are 
related or not.
Essentially, unlinkability means hiding the link 
between two or more actions, identities, or pieces 
of information [17].
Anonymity & Pseudonymity Corresponding privacy threat: Identifiability.
Anonymity  of  a  subject  means  the  subject  is 
not  identifiable  within  a  set  of  subjects,  the 
anonymity set. The anonymity set is the set of all 
possible subjects.
Essentially,  anonymity  means  hiding  the  link 
between an identity  and an action or a  piece of 
information.  Since  actions,  identities,  and pieces 
of  information  can  be  considered  as  IOIs, 
anonymity  can  be  described  in  terms  of 
unlinkability.
Pseudonymity refers to the use of pseudonyms 
as identifiers. An identifier of a subject other than 
its real name would be considered a pseudonym. 
Pseudonymity  does  not  automatically  imply 
anonymity between a subject's true identity and its 
pseudonym(s).
It  is  possible  to  build  a  reputation  on  a 
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pseudonym. Several pseudonyms can be used for 
different purposes.
Plausible deniability Corresponding privacy threat: Non-repudiation.
Plausible deniability in the context of privacy 
means  the  ability  to  deny  having  performed  a 
certain action that other parties should not be able 
to confirm or contradict.
This privacy property is in direct contradiction 
with  the  classical  security  property  non-
repudiation.
Undetectability & unobservability Corresponding privacy threat: Detectability.
Undetectability  of  an  item  of  interest  means 
that  the  attacker  cannot  sufficiently  distinguish 
whether it exists or not. For example messages in 
a  transfer  channel  should  not  be  able  to  be 
distinguished from random noise.
Unobservability  of  an  item of  interest  means 
that  1)  undetectability  of  the  IOI  from  the 
perspective  of  the  uninvolved  subjects,  and  2) 
anonymity  of  the  subject(s)  involved  even  with 
regards to other subjects involved in the IOI.
Confidentiality Corresponding  privacy  threat:  Disclosure  of 
information.
Confidentiality  means hiding the data  content 
or the controlled release of the data content,  for 
example transferring an encrypted message.
Soft privacy properties and their explanations and corresponding privacy threats are 
listed in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2. Soft privacy properties and threats
Privacy property Explanation
Content awareness Corresponding  privacy  threat:  Content 
unawareness.
Content  awareness  property  is  more  related 
with service providers such as Web 2.0 services. It 
makes  sure  that  users  are  aware  of  what 
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information related to them is stored and that only 
the  minimum  necessary  information  should  be 
used for functionality it is needed in.
Policy and consent compliance Corresponding privacy threat: Policy and consent 
non-compliance.
Policy  and  Consent  Compliance  property 
means  that  the  user  should  be  informed 
beforehand about the system's privacy policy, and 
the  user  should  be  allowed  to  consent  to  this 
policy in compliance with the legislation.
3.2.1 Unlinkability
Since SoInx is a social application, plenty of actions and pieces of information should 
be related to one another. For example, if an interesting person is discovered, the user 
should  to  be  able  to  chat  with  that  person.  Therefore  linkability  should  clearly  be 
allowed in a controlled manner.
In many cases unlinkability is generally desirable, for example adversary observers 
should not be able to follow users' movements around the city.
3.2.2 Anonymity and Pseudonymity
SoInx does not explicitly utilize the concept of identity or pseudonymity; the users are 
assumed to be anonymous between one another. However, the network identifier of the 
device running SoInx could be used as an implicit pseudonym. The network identifier 
changes periodically, but during the time interval it is constant, it is used for identifying 
the users who are sending messages related to SoInx functionality.
3.2.3 Plausible Deniability
In SoInx the ability to deny having performed a certain action that other parties should 
not be able to confirm or contradict,  is not built into the application. There are still  
implicit ways to achieve this; for example a user may claim that a certain action was 
done by someone else who was spoofing his/her network identifier.
3.2.4 Undetectability and Unobservability
Undetectability in SoInx is fairly limited; when messages are sent, any observer can 
determine that it was sent, and can even see the format of the message. Only some parts 
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of the messages (the encrypted payload) is what would be considered undetectable in 
SoInx.
The second part of unobservability (anonymity of the subject(s) involved even with 
regards to other subjects involved in the IOI) is usually upheld; SoInx does not reveal 
user's  identity  unless  the  user  explicitly  does  so  by  chatting  or  sharing  contact 
information.
3.2.5 Confidentiality
Confidentiality in SoInx applies mostly to the way the common interests between users 
are  shared,  using  the  common  interest  verification  protocol,  and  how  further 
communications are encrypted using the set of common interests as the encryption key 
(section 4.2). This would be considered as controlled release of data content. 
3.2.6 Content Awareness
Since SoInx does not use any central server, this privacy property does not apply to 
SoInx. However, the way SoInx allows users to define the privacy settings for different 
kinds of interest sources is tangential to this privacy property. The users should be made 
aware of how these sources of interests and the interests themselves are used for the 
application. 
3.2.7 Policy and Consent Compliance
Since SoInx in its current form is just a prototype, policy and consent compliance has 
not really been an issue. Any kinds of explicit privacy policies were not drafted for this 
application.
If SoInx was released commercially, the users should be made aware of the ways 
SoInx affects the privacy of the user. This would probably take the form of a terms of 
use approval before using SoInx.
3.3 Privacy in Ad Hoc Networks
Privacy in the context of ad hoc networks should be considered separately from server 
based privacy. With the peer-to-peer type environment of ad hoc networks, there is no 
single  trusted  party  (i.e.  the  central  server)  that  is  relied  upon  for  implementing 
sufficient  security  measures  for  preserving user  privacy.  Instead,  every  actor  has  to 
implement their own security mechanisms.
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3.3.1 Location Tracking Based on Network Identifiers
Devices using ad hoc networking use some kind of network identifier  to access the 
network.  One  example  is  the  MAC  address  of  the  WLAN  adapter.  An  adversary 
controlling multiple access points can use the network identifier to track the location of 
a user. In the case of WLAN, very accurate (up to 1 meter accuracy) location can be 
determined  if  multiple  access  points  are  used  to  collect  Signal-to-Noise-Ratio 
measurements [18].
This  type  of  location  tracking  can  be  avoided  by  using  disposable  interface 
identifiers; for example by changing the WLAN MAC address periodically [19].
3.3.2 Important Considerations
There are certain considerations that apply especially well in the context of proximity 
based  ad  hoc  networking.  These  should  be  taken  into  account  when  developing 
applications running in this context.
Broadcasting. In ad hoc networking context every sent message is broadcasted via a 
radio channel, which means that everyone with the proper equipment in close enough 
proximity can see every piece of data that is sent on the ad hoc network. Some type of 
encryption is highly advisable for any private data directed to a specific user.
Man-in-the-middle. When sent data is relayed through an intermediary device in the 
network, that device is by definition a man-in-the-middle, so man-in-the-middle attacks 
have to be taken into account [20]. These attacks can include various adversary actions, 
ranging from simply observing the sent  data  and trying to  break the encryption,  to 
tampering with the data before it is relayed to the other devices.
Battery life.  These  kinds  of  applications  are  usually  used with  a  mobile  device, 
which means that the battery life has to be accounted for when deciding security and 
privacy measures. Computational intensity and bandwith requirements must be balanced 
with the efficacy of the security protocols.
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4 SECURITY MECHANISMS OF SOINX
This chapter describes the security mechanisms SoInx uses for maintaining user privacy 
and  data  security.  The  main  security  mechanism  is  the  common  interest  exchange 
protocol based on sending hashed versions of interests between users. The verified set 
of common interests are also used as a basis for encrypting further messaging between 
the users.
The section  4.1 explains the high level overview of the common interest exchange 
protocol and the section 4.2 explains the encryption scheme. Later sections go into the 
details  and  specifics.  The  section  4.6 gives  an  example  of  the  interest  sharing  and 
verification process when two users have two common interests.
4.1 Common Interest Exchange Protocol
SoInx communicates with other devices by broadcasting messages. Since the messages 
often include things that the user finds interesting, it is important that only the intended 
receivers can decipher  the contents of  the message;  it  is  not  desirable  to  share this 
potentially personal information with everyone in proximity. When trying to discover 
other people with similar interests, only those interested in a certain subject should be 
able to deduce that you also are interested in that same subject.
SoInx  uses  its  own common interest  exchange  protocol  to  perform this  kind  of 
profile  information  exchange securely.  The protocol  between two users  is  based  on 
message chains where the initiator sends a query message (section 4.3.1), the other one 
responds with a match message (section 4.3.2) to which the original initiator responds 
with another match message. The match messages are used to verify for the recipient 
that common interests were recognized. Both parties work periodically as an initiator; 
the more these query-match-match chains are sent, the more common interests can be 
discovered. These messages do not contain actual interests, only query and match IDs 
which are derived via one-way hashing (section 4.4).
This is not always sufficient for solving every privacy threat. An adversary observer 
can deduce some information from the type of data sent between clients; for example, if 
after  a  few  query  messages  two  clients  start  sending  several  match  messages,  the 
adversary observer can conclude that they have at least some common interests. This 
means that some of the information is still detectable in the SoInx communication.
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The network identifier (i.e. the MAC address) of the mobile device can be used to 
identify a user. This is not a desirable feature, and it is handled on the device level; the 
network identifier is changed periodically to improve the privacy and anonymity of the 
user.
4.2 Encryption Protocol
In addition to a secure interest exchange scheme, any further messaging between two 
users  (such  as  chatting  or  sending  the  contact  card)  must  be  done  securely,  i.e. 
encrypted.  In ad hoc networks  with previously unseen encounters,  the local  context 
must be used to compose a common encryption key. This causes privacy problems that 
are difficult to solve, because plenty of things in the local context are also accessible to 
adversary observers in proximity. SoInx bases the encryption on common interests.
After  verifying  common  interests  between  two  SoInx  users,  the  set  of  common 
interests is used for encrypting further communication (e.g. chat messages) between the 
two SoInx users. The encryption algorithm SoInx uses is AES (Advanced Encryption 
Standard) [21]. AES is a symmetric-key cryptographic algorithm, so the decryption key 
is  the same as the encryption key. The key is  constructed from the set  of common 
interests discovered by the interest exchange protocol. The encryption key is an SHA1 
[22] hash of the concatenation of all the verified interests sorted alphabetically plus the 
current salt (section 4.4.1), separated by null characters.
These encrypted messages are placed in the payload field of match messages. These 
types  of  match  messages  differ  slightly  from  the  match  messages  used  purely  for 
interest verification purposes. Section 4.3.2 presents these in detail.
4.3 SoInx Messages
SoInx is sending two types of messages: query and match messages. Query messages 
are broadcasted when new devices appear in the range of the ad hoc network, although 
the  broadcasting  is  throttled  to  avoid  message  flooding  when  several  new  devices 
appear consecutively in short bursts. When no new users are encountered, the query 
messages are sent periodically and the time interval between query messages becomes 
longer if no new users are encountered. Match messages are sent to verify that one or 
more interests were recognized from query messages. More interest verification is done 
in  yet  another  match  message,  sent  by  the  original  query  message  sender.  Match 
messages  may  include  an  encrypted  payload;  this  payload  can  be  considered  sent 
through a secure communications channel between two SoInx users.
The messages below are described using JSON-representation, but in the application 
the messages are encoded with Bencode [23]. Bencode is a data encoding scheme suited 
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for storing and transmitting loosely structured data. Bencode was chosen because it is 
fairly efficient and for each possible value, there is only one valid Bencoded value. This 
latter feature permits simple comparisons and identical hashing values between identical 
data structures.
4.3.1 Query Messages
Query message is the basic broadcasting message the device will be sending out that 
contains a randomly chosen and randomly ordered list of the interests (20 at maximum 
per query message) in query ID form, derived from hashed interests (section 4.4). For 
each chosen interest one query ID of the five possible is chosen randomly. The query ID 
list in the message is in a string format; the different query ID values are concatenated 
together.
The number of query IDs per message is limited to 20 because otherwise the user 
could possibly be recognized by using the number of  query IDs in  a  message as a 
fingerprint.
The format of the message is:
{'type' : 'query', 'ids' : list-of-query-ids}
4.3.2 Match Messages
Match  messages  are  used  for  common  interest  verification  and  also  for  sending 
encrypted messages (payload) for specific users.
The format of the message is:
{'type' : 'msg', 'ids' : list-of-match-ids, 'data' : encrypted-payload, 'iv' : random-
initialization-vector-for-encryption, 'pad' : padding, 'tok' : token}
The list of the match IDs is non-empty only when the match message is used for 
common  interest  verification  purposes,  as  explained  in  section  4.1.  When  match 
messages are used for secure encrypted messaging between users, the match ID list is 
empty. The field tok refers to a token that denotes the set of verified interests at the time 
of  the  message  construction.  The  field  data contains  an  encrypted  payload  for 
communicating between users. The field iv contains a random initialization vector used 
for the encryption and the field padding contains the number of padding bytes used for 
the encryption.
If  the  match  message  is  used  for  common  interest  verification  purposes,  the 
encrypted payload is just information about the interests being verified. In the receiving 
device this information is simply ignored after decryption in the current version of the 
prototype. In these cases the match ID list of the message is also empty.
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If  the  match  message  is  not  for  common interest  verification  purposes,  then  the 
payload includes  private  messaging between two users  such as  chat  messages,  like-
notifications, or contact card information.
4.4 Query IDs and Match IDs
Query IDs and match IDs are generated via one-way hashing. Two hashes are calculated 
from every interest: the query hash and the match hash. Query refers to query messages 
and match refers to match messages, both of which are used in the common interest 
verification process.
A query hash is divided into query IDs and a match hash is divided into match IDs.  
The hashing algorithm used in SoInx is  SHA1, but  the concept can be extended to 
function with other hashing algorithms as well. The query hash and the match hash are 
salted  with salts  derived from the  time of  day and the salt  is  changed periodically. 
Everyone aware of the time is able to derive the salts; the salt is same during the whole 
time period before it is changed. The processes for deriving query IDs and match IDs 
are visualized in Figure 4.1 and  Figure 4.2 respectively.
Figure 4.1: Deriving query IDs
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In the prototype implementation the exact input for the SHA1 hashing algorithm is a 
concatenation of five text strings. For the query hash: the textual representation of the 
interest,  the null  character,  the string literal  ”query”,  another null  character,  and the 
current  salt.  For the match hash:  the textual representation of the interest,  the null 
character, the string literal ”match”, another null character, and the current salt.
SHA1 produces  hashes  with  the  length  of  20  bytes  [22].  One  query  hash  of  an 
interest is divided into five query IDs (Q1 through Q5 in Figure 4.1). This means that 
every query ID is 4 bytes long. The first query ID, Q1, is simply the first 4 bytes of the 
query hash, the second query ID, Q2, is the next 4 bytes and so on. The match hash is  
similarly divided into four match IDs (M1 through M4 in Figure 4.2), which means that 
every match ID is 5 bytes long.
Several query IDs and match IDs per interest are generated due to privacy issues 
(section  5.6). This makes it more difficult for an adversary observer to recognize the 
user using the set of seen query IDs as a fingerprint. The actual numbers (5 and 4 for 
query IDs and match IDs respectively) were chosen somewhat arbitrarily, but it has 
some implications: query ID collisions are more likely than match ID collisions. These 
collisions  can  make  certain  types  of  attacks  more  difficult  while  still  keeping  user 
experience intact. For reference: to reach a 1 % probability of a collision in a single 
query message of 20 query IDs, a set of 431659 unique interests is required.  With a 
match message of 20 match IDs, the required number of interests is 138130764.
These  query  IDs  and  match  IDs  are  used  in  query  and  match  messages,  when 
referred to as interests in an encrypted form. Each query message contains query IDs for 
20 interests; one query ID per interest, which is chosen randomly.
Figure 4.2: Deriving match IDs
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4.4.1 Salt
Salts for both query and match hashes are based on the time of day in such a way that 
each salt is valid for a certain time interval at a time. The prototype implementation uses 
one hour long time intervals.
Some crypto applications generate a new salt for every sent message and include this 
salt into the message. This is not realistic for SoInx purposes; then query IDs would 
have to be recomputed for each interest for every received message when searching for 
matching interests.  This time-based salting requires this  recomputation only once an 
hour.
The current salt can be derived by taking the current time in seconds and dividing it 
by the time interval (also in seconds). The result of the division is rounded down:
saltcurrent=⌊ current timetime interval ⌋
The prototype implementation uses Unix time (also known as POSIX time) for the 
current time. It is defined as the number of seconds that have elapsed since 00:00:00 
Coordinated Universalt Time (UTC), Thursday, 1 January 1970 [24].
When the application is run on the simulator, the current time is received from the 
simulator, which uses its own time concept. The simulated time is simply the elapsed 
seconds since the start of the simulation (the time in the simulated environment, not the 
actual time).
4.5 Handling Received Messages
When receiving messages, the first thing to do is trying to decode it, the assumption 
being that it is in a Bencode format. If the decoding fails, the message is either garbled 
or it is sent by some other application, and the message is not SoInx compatible. In this 
case, the message is simply ignored.
If  decoding  succeeds,  the  field  'type'  of  the  message  is  examined.  The  only 
acceptable 'type'  values are 'query'  (a query message)  and 'msg'  (a  match message), 
otherwise the message is again ignored.
4.5.1 Handling a Query Message
Processing a query message constitutes mainly of trying to figure out whether you have 
any of the same interests that the query message contains. If query IDs are recognized, 
the  verification  process  will  be  started,  where  SoInx  attempts  to  confirm  that  the 
different  SoInx  users  indeed  have  the  same  interests.  The  process  is  showcased  in 
section 4.6
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Whenever a query message is seen, it is first confirmed that the field 'ids'  of the 
Bencoded message is a string, otherwise the message is ignored. The contained query 
IDs are examined. For each recognized query ID, a corresponding interest is taken, and 
the set  of recognized interests  (i.e.  corresponding match IDs) is  used for the match 
messages during the verification process.
The recognized interests  are  marked as unverified common interests  between the 
sender of the query message.
4.5.2 Handling a Match Message
When a received match message includes a non-empty match ID list, this means that the 
sender  has  started  a  verification  process.  The  sender  aims  to  verify  some common 
interests. If all the match IDs are recognized, the recognized interests are used to form 
an encryption key that is used in decrypting the payload of the match message.
If the decryption succeeds, the receiver can be sure that the interests recognized from 
the match ID list are common for both parties. This is when the unverified common 
interests can be marked as verified common interests. The sender is still unsure (i.e. the 
interests are marked as unverified common interests from the sender's point of view); 
the verification has to happen in the other direction as well. This is done by sending a 
similar  verification  match  message  to  the  original  sender  of  the  received  match 
message. Next section presents a detailed example of the common interest verification 
protocol.
When the match ID list  of the match message is empty,  the message is used for 
communicating encrypted private information. The verification steps described above 
are skipped, and the encrypted payload is  simply decrypted with the set  of verified 
common  interests,  and  the  contents  of  the  decrypted  message  are  used  for  further 
processing,  such  as  displaying  the  received  chat  message,  displaying  the  received 
contact information, etc.
4.6 Common Interest Verification Process Example
The verification process for common interests consists of sending several query and 
match messages. The process between a SoInx client A and a SoInx client B who have 
two common interests i1 and i2 is as follows:
Phase 1. Client  A sends a query message.  Client  B sees the query message and 
recognizes that the interests  i1 and i2 correspond to two query IDs in client A's query 
message. Client B marks interests i1 and i2 as unverified common interests.
Phase 2. User B constructs a match message with a list of match IDs that correspond 
to the interests i1 and i2, and a payload encrypted with an encryption key derived from 
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i1 and i2, and broadcasts it. The payload is just information about i1 and i2 in a textual 
form.
Phase 3. Client A sees the match message and recognizes that the match IDs found 
in  the  message  were  derived  from the  interests  i1 and  i2.  Client  A constructs  an 
encryption key from i1 and i2, and tries to decrypt the payload in the match message. 
The decryption succeeds; now client A can mark i1 and i2 as verified common interests.
Phase 4. Client A constructs a match message with match IDs that correspond to the 
interests i1 and i2 and a payload encrypted with an encryption key derived from i1 and 
i2, and broadcasts it.
Phase 5. Client B sees the match message and recognizes that the containing match 
IDs correspond to the interests i1 and i2. Client B constructs an encryption key from i1 
and i2, and tries to decrypt the payload in the match message. The decryption succeeds; 
now client B can mark interests i1 and i2 from unverified to verified common interests.
After  this  process,  both  users  A and  B now know that  they  share  two common 
interests i1 and i2.
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5 PRIVACY ANALYSIS OF SOINX
This chapter discusses privacy issues in a mobile social application running on ad hoc 
networks, such as SoInx, and describes how the security mechanisms of SoInx work to 
solve those issues.
There are rigorous and formal privacy threat analysis frameworks [17]; the approach 
here is less formal: each privacy issue description explains how the user's privacy is 
being affected, then the SoInx solution is discussed. If the current version of SoInx does 
not address the issue, possible solutions are proposed. 
5.1 Using Network Identifier For Linkability
Network identifiers such as MAC addresses or Bluetooth addresses can easily be used 
to link encountered users with previous encounters,  henceforth breaking the privacy 
property of unlinkability.  One way to solve this  is  to  change the network identifier 
periodically. This may require hardware support.
SoInx application  assumes  this  type  of  solution.  The  network  identifier  change 
coincides with the salt change described in section 4.4.1, causing the generation of new 
query and match IDs. The simulator provides this kind of changing network identifiers, 
as described in section 2.7.2.
During  the  time  interval  the  network  identifier  is  constant,  it  is  trivial  to  link 
messages,  but  this  is  desired  behavior  and  required  for  the  functionality  of  the 
application.
5.2 Broadcasting Sensitive Information
User's interests may contain some private and sensitive information. Therefore, it should 
be up to the user to decide which interests  can and cannot be broadcasted in query 
messages, and matched using the verification protocol.
To achieve this, SoInx has a user interface to define which sources of information are 
sensitive enough to be completely private in the context of SoInx application. This is 
described in section 2.6.4.
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5.3 Seeing Broadcasted Interests
User's  interests  may  contain  some  private  information.  It  is  not  desired  that  every 
interest from a broadcasted query message can be examined by every actor operating in 
close enough proximity, but the user might still wish to reveal these interests to people 
with same interests.
The solution to this in SoInx is that instead of using plain text representations of 
interests, query (and match) IDs of the interests are used. Since query and match IDs are 
generated via one way hashing, only those with the same interests can recognize them.
5.4 Eavesdropping on Private Communication
When two SoInx users have established a set of common interests, they may wish to 
contact each other for example for chatting purposes. It is not desirable that everyone in 
proximity can examine the contents of these messages, as the messages might contain 
private information.
SoInx  solves  this  by  encrypting  all  further  messages  between  SoInx  users  after 
establishing common interests. The encryption key is derived from the verified common 
interests.
5.5 Using Query ID Sets to Link Encounters
The set of seen query IDs from a user can be used as a fingerprint to recognize that user.  
Whenever a new user is encountered, its broadcast message can be compared to earlier 
broadcast messages. If the broadcast message has the same set of query IDs as an earlier 
broadcast message, it is almost certain that the user is the same one as in the earlier 
encounter.
SoInx solves this by generating new query IDs periodically. This problem still exists 
during the time interval the query IDs are unchanged.  That  is  why SoInx also uses 
several different query IDs for each interest. The query ID for a certain interest used in a 
query message is chosen randomly. Query ID generationg mechanics are discussed in 
more detail in 4.4.
5.6 Using Query ID Set Sizes as Fingerprints
Using the number  of  query IDs a  user  is  sending could be used as  a  rough,  albeit  
uncertain, fingerprint to recognize whether the user has been seen before.
The SoInx makes this harder using a two-fold solution; there is a limit on the query 
IDs a query message can contain.  In the prototype implementation it  is 20. Another 
mechanism is the generation of several query IDs for each interest,  in the prototype 
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implementation 5 query IDs. In query messages, a query ID for a certain interest  is 
chosen at random.
5.7 Histogram of Query IDs as a Fingerprint
Some interests  can be  more important  to  a  user  than  others.  Therefore,  it  could be 
desirable  to  send  query  IDs  of  those  interests  more  often  than  query  IDs  of  less 
interesting ones. This would more quickly find matches that the user deems important.
A downside of this is that the frequencies of different query IDs broadcasted can be 
used  to  form a  histogram.  This  histogram could  be  used  as  a  rough  fingerprint  to 
recognize users.
SoInx solves this by always using a random sample of interests for each broadcasted 
query message.
5.8 Physical Observations
Since a SoInx device communicates with other devices in close enough proximity, in 
some situations it is possible to recognize the SoInx user just by looking around. For 
example, if SoInx clients are communicating and you can see only one person closeby, 
it is likely that the person is carrying the device running the SoInx application. This type 
of situation can easily break anonymity.
SoInx application does not address this type of privacy threat. One way to solve this 
is to just shut down the application in situations like this. This would require user action 
and vigilance from the user to notice these kinds of situations.
5.9 Other Applications Leaking Identity
It is possible that other applications running on the device can leak the identity of the 
user. Therefore in spite of all the precautions related to privacy and data security, the 
privacy of the user could be trivially compromised.
This is not addressed in the SoInx application, but one way to solve this could be to 
make sure that SoInx is not using the same network identifier as other applications. This 
may require hardware support.
5.10 Recognized and Unrecognized Query ID sets
The  set  of  recognized  interests  from  query  IDs,  combined  with  the  number  of 
unrecognized query IDs in relation to the total number of query IDs seen from a SoInx 
user can possibly be used as a fingerprint to link a new encounter to a previously seen 
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SoInx user. This would require an interest database for recognizing some of the query 
IDs seen, and this type of attack is analogous to a dictionary attack.
The impelemented hostile client described in section 6.2 shows that this could be a 
feasible attack that breaks the privacy property of unlinkability of SoInx users.
5.11 Summary of Security Mechanisms for Maintaining 
Privacy in SoInx
The main security  mechanisms of  SoInx for maintaining privacy are the encryption 
protocol based on common interests between two SoInx users, and the common interest 
exchange protocol based on one-way hashing of interests.
The protocols allow for SoInx users to establish a set of common interests between 
two users, and use these common interests as an encryption key to encrypt any further 
communication between users. The protocols have several implementation choices that 
are not initially obvious (such as using several query and match IDs, forced randomness 
of chosen interests in query messages, etc.) but as discussed in this chapter, they prove 
to be important components in maintaining user privacy.
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6 HOSTILE CLIENT
One way to evaluate privacy and security of a social  application is to create hostile 
clients to study how well data security and privacy of the users are maintained. Hostile  
clients work in the same environment that the application, but instead of participating in 
the ordinary functionality of the application, they try to perform actions to breach the 
user  privacy  or  security.  Possible  ways  to  achieve  this  could  include  for  example 
sending specifically crafted messages to reveal something unwanted about the receiving 
user, or just passively listening to messages other users are sending to one another and 
exploiting the possible inherent insecurities in the communication protocol.
There are several different types of hostile clients that could be run in the SoInx 
environment to extract unwanted information. A hostile client could just be a passive 
observer, or it  could disguise itself  as an ordinary SoInx client while examining the 
communication between other SoInx clients and attempting to find holes in privacy and 
data  security.  One  hostile  client  was  implemented  during  the  SoInx  project.  It  is 
discussed in more detail in section 6.2.
6.1 Hostile Client With Massive Interest Database
Since the encryption of SoInx messages are based on common interests between parties, 
a hostile client with a database of all the possible interests would theoretically be able to 
break  the  encryption  on  every  message  sent  by  the  SoInx  application,  and  also  to 
recognize with a high probability if an encountered user has been seen before. This type 
of hostile client would work well as a passive observer. This type of attack is equivalent  
to a dictionary attack.
Having a database of all the possible interests is not feasible, since the number of 
possible interests is limitless. As an example, in our crawled set of 46500 Facebook 
profiles, there are over 3 million unique interests (all the unique likes and friends found 
in  the  profiles).  Taking  into  account  other  sources  of  interests,  constructing  a 
comprehensive  set  of  interests  would  be  computationally  difficult.  However,  the 
crawled set of Facebook profiles shows that it is feasible to mine social networking sites 
for millions of interests.
Even if  only some of  the  interests  can be recognized from query messages,  this 
attack may still  be used to link the encountered users with previous encounters; the 
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recognized interests and the number of unrecognized ones could be used as a fingerprint 
for recognizing SoInx users. As the example implementation shows, this approach is a 
feasible way to breach user privacy in the SoInx environment.
6.2 Implementation
The type of hostile client implemented during the project was a passive listener that 
functions in the SoInx environment observing messages. It uses an interest database and 
intends to recognize users it  has seen before,  therefore linking new encounters with 
previous encounters. Performing this with a high enough success rate would break the 
privacy property of unlinkability, and it would allow to track movements of SoInx users.
The high level  functionality  of  the hostile  client  is  illustrated in  Figure  6.1.  The 
hostile client collects data, and the data is analyzed (for attempting to link encounters 
with each other) as post-processing. This type of separation is useful because it allows 
for multiple hostile clients to collect data and send them to an aggregate database via the 
Internet.  The aggregated data can then be analyzed as a whole.  The implementation 
consisted of only one hostile client. 
6.2.1 Collected Data
The hostile client collects data whenever it sees SoInx users sending messages to one 
another. The only messages observed are query messages.
The data observed in a query message is associated with the network identifier of the 
SoInx  user  and  with  the  time  of  the  sent  message.  Since  the  network  identifier  is 
changed periodically, the collected data is later analyzed to deduce whether the user 
with one network identifier  is the same user with a different network identifier at a 
different point of time.
The collected data for a single network identifier is derived from every broadcasted 
query message seen during the time block the user has a constant network identifier.
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6.2.2 Post-processing
In the post-processing phase, the different encounters are compared with one another 
and  collected  data  related  to  those  encounters  is  analyzed  to  deduce  whether  two 
encounters are from the same SoInx user or not.
In the analysis, following data is considered when comparing two encounters E1 and 
E2: the total number of recognized interests (for both encounters)  r1 and r2, the total 
number of unrecognized query IDs (for both encounters) u1 and u2, the total number of 
recognized interests that are found in both encounters c (c as in common).
The number of seen query IDs for an encounter depends on the number of seen query 
messages, and the number of seen query messages depends on how long the encounter 
has  lasted.  This  must  be  taken  into  account  when  trying  to  decide  whether  two 
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encounters  are  from  the  same  user  or  not.  To  account  for  this,  ratios  were  used 
(calculated only if r1 > 0 and r2 > 0):
ratio1 = u1 / r1
ratio2 = u2 / r2
The preliminary algorithm for this decision was fairly simple:
The encounters E1 and E2 are considered same if and only if
c>0∧ min (ratio1 , ratio2)
max(ratio1 , ratio2)
>0.6
6.3 Results of Hostile Client Execution
An example run was done with a database of 100000 interests. These interests were the 
most common interests found in the database of crawled Facebook profiles. The total 
number of unique interests found in the profiles was over 3 million, so the hostile client 
interest  database  size  was  only  about  3  % of  the  possible  number  of  encountered 
interests.
In total,  there were 2814 comparisons between different encounters. 142 of those 
were from same users, and 2672 of those were from different users.
Of those 142 cases where the two encounters were from the same user, the hostile 
client was able to recognize 119, and in the remaining 23 cases it falsely assumed the 
encounters to be from different users.
Of those 2672 cases where the two encounters were from different users, the hostile 
client was able to correctly recognize 2608, and in the remaining 64 cases it falsely 
assumed the encounters to be from same users.
So 83.8 % of the linkable encounters were recognized. This percentage is likely to 
improve with a larger interest database and by using more sophisticated algorithms for 
deducing whether two encounters are from the same user. From a privacy standpoint 
this poses a linkability threat in the SoInx application.
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7 EVALUATION OF SOINX
This chapter discusses the evaluation of the SoInx application based on the user testing. 
The evaluation of SoInx security mechanisms for maintaining privacy of the users is 
also discussed, and several avenues for improvements are presented. 
7.1 User Tests
User tests were conducted during the SoInx project. The SoInx application was tested, 
mainly  to  find  bugs  and  to  evaluate  the  user  interface  and  to  get  new  ideas  for 
improving the software.
The tests were conducted on a desktop computer, using the simulated environment. 
The visualization of the simulation (section 2.7.2) and the SoInx client connected to the 
simulation were shown on the same screen. The user being tested was explained their 
simulated location would be shown on the map, and the SoInx client view was what 
would be shown on their device. An ongoing user test is shown in Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: A user test subject interacting with the SoInx application connected to the 
simulator.
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The simulation lasted for 5 days of simulated time with 899 simulated user clients 
and 1 user client taking input from the test subject. The simulated area was the city of 
Tampere.
A single user test lasted for about 2 hours, after which the test subject answered 
questions regarding the SoInx client and the test. Earlier answers were used to improve 
the test questions and to make them more specific. The answers provided also good 
input for improving the simulator and the SoInx client.
Whenever a test had an encounter in the simulation, they could use the user interface 
to indicate several possible things: they liked the encountered person, they wished to 
chat with the encountered person, and/or they wished to share contact information with 
the encountered person. Not  choosing to  do some or  any of those actions was also 
considered significant data, and was recorded.
The concern over privacy was almost non-existent among the test subjects. This was 
even without explaining the security mechanisms that SoInx uses. Among reasons were 
that they did not care if Facebook data (likes and friend relationships) was public, and 
that they were aware that this kind of data is already known for corporations such as 
Google or Facebook.
The results  of  the  user  tests  are  covered  more  thoroughly  in  the  thesis  of  Saku 
Rautiainen [25].
7.2 Encryption Based on Common Interests
The interest  database  based  adversary  client  proved to  be  feasible,  especially  when 
interests used in SoInx are mainly derived from social networking sites that are easy to 
crawl.  Therefore,  the  encryption  that  is  based  on  shared  interests  may  need  some 
reconsideration, especially when privacy and security are more essential requirements 
of an application.
7.3 Ideas for Improvement
There are several possible avenues for improving the privacy of the users of the SoInx 
application (or similar social applications running in the environment of mobile ad hoc 
networks).
7.3.1 Diffie-Hellman and Other Key Exchange Protocols
Diffie-Hellman key exchange method is  a way for two parties  to establish a shared 
secret key [26]. This key can in turn be used to encrypt ensuing communication between 
each other.
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This key exchange and encryption could be used as an extra layer on the encryption 
protocol used by SoInx. The Diffie-Hellman encryption could be used before or after 
the common interest based encryption,  but after  the interest  (query ID) broadcasting 
step, leaving user privacy still vulnerable to the example hostile client attack.
Using the Diffie-Hellman encryption before the basic interest broadcasting is feasible 
only when the number of proximate SoInx users is fairly low, since every user would 
have to establish an encrypted channel with every other user it encounters before it can 
broadcast its interests (query IDs), which would multiply the amount of communication 
required for the basic interest sharing use case. This is in conflict with the requirements 
of minimizing network traffic and power consumption. Also, the hostile client could just 
establish a Diffie-Hellman based encrypted channel with each user it encounters, and 
then view the same information it could see by just examining the broadcasted query 
IDs.
As  an  extra  encryption  layer  this  would  eliminate  (i.e.  make  it  computationally 
difficult) the attack where the adversary client knows all the common interests between 
communicating parties, and uses the information to calculate the shared encryption key 
used to establish the encrypted channel between two users.
Diffie-Hellman is also vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack [26].
7.3.2 Tweaking Hashing Parameters
The algorithms and parameters used for hashing can be modified to make calculations 
for interest verification steps more difficult, therefore making calculation based attacks 
computationally more difficult. This has the unfortunate effect of making the normal 
application use calculations to  consume more power,  so a  proper  balance has to  be 
found.
The hashing algorithm could be swapped with a more difficult one, or even with an 
algorithm where the computational difficulty can be adjusted such as bcrypt [27]. Also 
more hash values could be computed from an interest, and subsequently more query IDs 
could be generated from the interests, to make associating query/match IDs with their 
original interests more difficult.
7.3.3 Discouraging Easily Crawlable Interest Sources
Certain interest sources may be troublesome in the context of privacy. For example the 
crawled interest database proved that Facebook is fairly easily crawlable and therefore 
Facebook based interests  are  vulnerable to  attacks  based on interest  databases.  This 
concern is likely valid for many other social networking sites as well.
An example of an interest source that is easily generatable is phone numbers. Since 
phone numbers tend to obey a previously known form, generating a large phone number 
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based interest database is straightforward. Therefore phone numbers as such may not be 
the best possible interest source. A way to make phone numbers feasible is to attach the 
contact name to the phone number. This would require normalization of the names, such 
as lower casing all the letters, removing special characters, and sorting first, middle, and 
last names alphabetically, because interest matching requires interests to be exactly the 
same in  their  source  form due to  hashing algorithms used (even one  bit  difference 
produces completely different query IDs).
7.3.4 Recognizing and Reacting to Certain Attacks
SoInx  could  be  modified  to  notice  certain  abnormal  network  behavior,  that  could 
indicate that someone is performing an attack on SoInx. If certain behavior is detected, 
communications could be turned completely off until the attack ceases.
For example, an attacker could be flooding the network with query messages in order 
to reveal faster what interests users have. Currently this type of situation is not detected.
Another example of abnormal behavior would be when someone has suspiciously 
high  number  of  common  interests  with  you.  This  may  indicate  that  someone  is 
performing an attack using a large interest database. This would be a good situation to 
scale down communications.
7.3.5 Context Depending Behavior
The application could be configured to behave differently depending on the context, in 
relation to privacy. This could take the form of different modes, such as Paranoid-mode, 
Feeling Social -mode et cetera, where the number of interests broadcasted and overall 
communications depend on the current mode. These modes could partly be deduced 
from the calendar / current profile of the device – e.g. when the calendar shows that the 
user is in an important meeting, SoInx communication could be turned completely off.
7.3.6 PSI & PCSI protocols
Research have already been done on how parties can privately compute an intersection 
of their respective sets of data. This can be done using PSI (private set intersection) 
protocols  [28].  These  cryptographic  protocols  could  be used where  the  sets  of  data 
would be the interests and the intersection would be the common interests between two 
parties.
Instead of computing the intersection of data, it is also possible to compute only the 
size of the intersection. This can be achieved with a PCSI (private cardinality of set-
interesection) protocol.
Instead of directly revealing the common interests with the encountered user, a layer 
could  be  added  where  only  the  number  of  common  interests  is  revealed  without 
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revealing the actual interests.  If  the number of common interests  is  above a  certain 
threshold, the current interest matching protocol would be used. This may impair the 
user experience; the user may want an alert every time a certain very important interest 
is matched with another user.
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8 CONCLUSIONS
This thesis introduced basics of privacy in the ad hoc networking context, emphasis on 
social applications. An example social application, SoInx, based on ad hoc networking, 
was  introduced.  Also  a  simulator  environment  for  testing  such  applications  was 
described.
A major  objective  of  the  thesis  was  to  analyze  how  privacy  of  a  user  can  be 
maintained  in  this  type  of  applications.  The  security  mechanisms  of  SoInx  were 
described in detail and also how they solve certain privacy and security issues.
The  security  mechanisms  were  evaluated  by  implementing  a  hostile  client  that 
attempts to breach user privacy. The hostile client attempts to figure out whether newly 
encountered SoInx users had been seen before by utilizing a database of interests (this 
was basically a type of dictionary attack). This attack proved to be feasible; it breaks the 
privacy property of linkability, making it possible to track people's movements around 
the  city.  The  common  interest  verification  scheme  and  the  shared  interest  based 
encryption were found lacking in the context of privacy.
Social  applications running purely on ad hoc networking context also have some 
fundamental privacy threats based on physical reality, such as deducing the identity of a 
user when there are few people in adversary's physical proximity as described in section 
5.8. Also the lack of a trusted party, such as in central server based applications, reduces 
the certainty of the privacy measures.
Currently  almost  all  popular  social  applications  are  central  server  based.  These 
include services such as Facebook, Tinder, Hilight, FourSquare, etc.
It is the opinion of the author that the current security mechanisms used in SoInx are 
not  sufficient  enough  for  maintaining  user  privacy,  and  the  subject  matter  requires 
further research.
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